Saving proof from paradox: Gödel’s paradox and the inconsistency of informal mathematics by Fenner Tanswell (5731730)
Saving Proof from Paradox: Go¨del’s Paradox and
the Inconsistency of Informal Mathematics
Fenner Stanley Tanswell∗
Arche´ Philosophical Research Centre, Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews,
St Andrews KY16 9AL, U.K.
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4AL, U.K.
Abstract
In this paper I shall consider two related avenues of argument that have
been used to make the case for the inconsistency of mathematics: firstly,
Go¨del’s paradox which leads to a contradiction within mathematics and,
secondly, the incompatibility of completeness and consistency established
by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. By bringing in considerations from
the philosophy of mathematical practice on informal proofs, I suggest that
we should add to the two axes of completeness and consistency a third
axis of formality and informality. I use this perspective to respond to
the arguments for the inconsistency of mathematics made by Beall and
Priest, presenting problems with the assumptions needed concerning for-
malisation, the unity of informal mathematics and the relation between
the formal and informal.
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1 Introduction
Is mathematics consistent? While in practice we generally proceed as if it
is, for dialetheists such as Priest in (Priest 1987), mathematics is one of the
main battlegrounds on which to establish that inconsistencies do indeed
arise and require their dialetheist solutions. In this paper I shall consider
two related avenues of argument that have been used to make the case for
the inconsistency of mathematics: firstly, paradoxes which lead to con-
tradictions internal to mathematics and, secondly, the incompatibility of
completeness and consistency established by Go¨del’s incompleteness the-
orems. These two strands of argument are closely connected, for the most
apparently problematic paradox in the case of mathematics is Go¨del’s
∗This work was supported by the Caroline Elder Scholarship and a St Andrews/Stirling
Philosophy Scholarship. Many thanks to two anonymous referees, Aaron Cotnoir, Benedikt
Lo¨we, Noah Friedman-Biglin, Jc Beall, Graham Priest, Alex Yates, Ryo Ito, Morgan Thomas
and audiences in St Andrews, Cambridge and Munich.
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paradox, that of the sentence which says of itself that it is unprovable,
which is closely related to common constructions of Go¨del sentences for
formal systems whereby we get to the balancing act between completeness
and consistency.
My response to the two lines of dialetheist argument will bring in con-
siderations from the philosophy of mathematical practice on the nature
of informal proofs. One thing I will argue for is that we should add to
the two axes of completeness and consistency a third axis of formality
and informality. Given this third axis, we can consider the dialetheist
arguments in two different ways. At the informal end, the previously
problematic paradoxes may be genuine, but I argue that there is no com-
pelling reason to see them as internal to mathematics. Meanwhile, at the
formal end of the scale, considerations of the practical role of formalisation
in mathematics will allow me to make a positive case for incompleteness
over inconsistency without begging the question against the dialetheists.
My main conclusion will be that the dialetheist arguments considered do
not establish that mathematics is inconsistent.
Answering the ultimate question of whether mathematics is consistent
from this perspective which encompasses informal proofs and mathemati-
cal practice would, I believe, be a major undertaking, and one which I am
not intending to complete here. The intention is rather to take the first
step in this direction by demonstrating that the matter is not already set-
tled, since the standard arguments from Go¨del’s theorems and the paradox
of provability do not succeed. In fact, I believe these arguments fall apart
through a number of the assumptions they need about informal proofs,
the nature of mathematics and the process of formalisation, so I shall
proceed to raise these objections in turn.
To begin, section 2 will introduce the key distinction between formal
and informal proofs that my arguments will focus on. Next, in section 3
I will lay out what Go¨del’s paradox is and why I do not take it to be a
concern for mathematics. In section 4 I lay out Priest’s longer argument
for the inconsistency of informal mathematics based on the application
of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem to informal mathematics and the
conclusions he draws from this concerning the inherent inconsistency of
informal mathematics. In section 5, I argue that the way of understanding
formalisation on which Priest’s argument succeeds is a bad one, then show
that a better understanding means the argument no longer goes through.
In sections 6 and 7, I argue against the thought that we can formalise
mathematics as single theory, proposing that a better thought would be
to approach formalisation in a fragmented way. Finally, in section 8 I
consider formality and informality as a third axis, and a final argument
against Priest that he changes the subject in switching between the formal
and informal.
2 Formal and Informal Proofs
Before we can begin, we need to be sufficiently clear on the distinction
between formal and informal proofs, as this will play a central role in the
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remainder of this paper.1
Formal proofs are those which are studied in logic and proof theory,
and may be defined in the usual way. For example, we might define a for-
mal language, give rules for well-formed formulae in that language, specify
axioms to be taken as basic and lay down inference rules for stepping be-
tween formulae. A formal proof (relative to such a specified system) will
be a (usually finite) sequence of formulae where each is either an axiom
or follows stepwise from previous formulae by an application of one of the
inference rules, where the final formula is a statement of what was to be
proven and is thus established as a theorem in the system.
However, formal proofs are rarely seen in actual mathematical practice.
Instead the type of proofs that are employed by mathematicians in their
daily activities, teaching and published work tend to be very different.
In most cases no formal language is specified, axioms are rarely given
and inferences are not confined to just the basic rules. Steps in these
proofs can rather be leaps and invoke the background knowledge of your
target audience, the semantic understanding of the terms being employed,
visualisation, diagrams and topic-specific styles of reasoning. Let us call
proofs in this sense informal proofs. Although this would be extremely
unsatisfying as a definition, it is certainly not intended as such as one
of the main challenges for philosophers of mathematical practice is to
pin down exactly what counts as a good, legitimate, correct and rigorous
informal proof and filling this out further would take me beyond the scope
of this paper. Nonetheless, there is a good deal of literature that does
deal with this issue that elaborates on the distinction I am invoking (see
Robinson 1991; Hersh 1997; Rav 1999; Leitgeb 2009; Marfori 2010; Larvor
2012, etc.).
A number of the differences between these two types of proof will affect
the assessment of whether the arguments I am considering successfully
establish that mathematics is inconsistent. Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem relates to proof as an explicitly defined, formal notion attached
to a formal system and one of my main counter-arguments in what is to
come is that this will not transpose across to apply to informal proofs.
Go¨del’s proof tells us about the limits of formal systems which meet certain
conditions, like having a certain amount of expressive power, being able
to prove a certain amount of basic mathematics (enough to allow for the
required coding etc.) and having an effective procedure for enumerating
its theorems. What will be required for the dialetheist line to work, then,
will be to show that informal proofs are close enough to formal ones to even
begin applying these conditions and that they then meet them. I will argue
to the contrary that informal proofs are sufficiently different that the proof
will not apply. Some key differences of informal proofs that will play a role
later include the social and contextual components of whether such a proof
is successful or not; the partially-fragmented nature of modern (informal)
mathematics; and the fact that informal mathematics extends to include
1A terminological note: while I speak of ‘informal proofs’ and ‘formal proofs’, some of
the literature on this subject instead speaks of ‘proofs’ and ‘derivations’ to get at the same
distinction. In (Priest 1987), Priest also uses the term ‘na¨ıve proof’ to refer to the informal
proofs.
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diagrammatic proofs which have more intuitive inferential rules. Finally,
even if the dialetheist arguments manage to establish that informal proofs
can be formalised appropriately, there will still be the need to show that
the conditions are met.2
Before getting the details of the argument from Go¨del’s theorems, let
me assess whether a simpler argument from paradox outlined by Beall is
sufficient to show that mathematics is inconsistent.
3 Go¨del’s Paradox and Beall’s Argument
The first argument I will consider comes from Go¨del’s paradox.3 Let us
begin, therefore, by examining the paradox:
GP: This sentence is (informally) unprovable.
Suppose GP is false; then it is informally provable. Since we take our
informal mathematical proofs to establish mathematical truths, it follows
that GP is also true. Yet this contradicts the assumption that GP is false,
so using proof by contradiction we establish that GP is true. However,
since we have just proved GP, it is informally provable. But GP states
that it is unprovable, so it must be false. Contradiction.
Now consider how it is that this paradox might show that mathematics
is inconsistent. Beall gives the following argument:
There seems to be little hope of denying that [GP] is indeed a
sentence of our informal mathematics. Accordingly, the only
way to avoid the above result is to revert to formalising away
the inconsistency— a response familiar from the histories of
na¨ıve set theory, na¨ıve semantic theory, and so on. If one does
this, however, then (by familiar results) one loses complete-
ness, which can be regained only by endorsing inconsistency.
Either way, then, we seem to be led to inconsistent mathemat-
ics. (Beall 1999, p. 324)
Setting aside the option to formalise away the inconsistency until section 4,
the initial argument is that since GP is part of mathematics and GP leads
to an inconsistency, it must therefore be that there is an inconsistency in
mathematics. In the rest of this section I will undertake the (purportedly
hopeless) task of denying that GP is part of mathematics.
The only sensible suggestion as to why GP should be part of mathe-
matics, it would seem, is that GP concerns the broadly mathematical con-
cept of informal provability. I contend, though, that this is not sufficient
to make GP a statement of mathematics. The reason is that I take the
concept of informal proof to be used to talk and reason about mathemat-
ics without it being a part of mathematics. While the former is obvious,
for the paradox to render mathematics inconsistent we actually need the
2In (Priest 1987), Priest argues that these conditions will be met. I believe that the flawed
step in the argument is the earlier one of formalisation (as will be covered in section 5), so I
will not actively engage in a discussion about whether this formalisation will have an effective
calculus etc.
3At this point we are only concerned with the informal version of the paradox. Later I
take on the formal results of Go¨del’s theorems.
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later, more contentious claim. Of course, I hold that informal proof and
provability are very important notions in talking about mathematics, but
it is crucial to emphasise that these are notions about mathematics. To
establish that the paradox will render mathematics inconsistent, though,
we need the extra claim that it is a part of informal mathematics. In gen-
eral, a statement being about mathematics and a statement being part
of mathematics can coincide, but certainly don’t always. Consider the
following:
(1) Mathematics is traditionally done on blackboards.
(2) This square building with 12m sides must have an area of 144m2.
(3) 111, 111, 111× 111, 111, 111 = 12, 345, 678, 987, 654, 321.
(4) Ron likes bacon and eggs.
Here (1) is a statement about mathematics but is not itself a part of
mathematics. In contrast, (2) is a mathematical statement which is being
applied to a situation, so in a relevant sense is not about mathematics. The
third item is both mathematical as a statement and about a mathematical
fact, while the fourth sentence is neither. Since these two notions can
be pulled apart with minimal effort, that a sentence falls under one of
them certainly can’t constitute a reason to think that it falls under the
other. It can therefore be concluded that the notion of informal provability
being about mathematics is not sufficient to establish that GP falls within
mathematics.
One can also give positive arguments as to why informal provability
should not be considered a concept within mathematics. For example, the
lack of a precise mathematical definition we observed in section 2 clearly
supports the claim that informal provability is not a notion internal to
mathematics. Nor does it interrelate with other mathematical concepts in
the way that standard mathematical concepts do (such as, for example,
group, integer, derivative, line, etc.). The only notable conceptual link
it has is with truth, as exploited by the paradox, but if anything the
informal notion of truth in mathematics (before being formalised into
some formal theory of truth) will belong to the same category of notions
about mathematics that are not within mathematics.
By denying that informal provability is a concept within informal
mathematics, it can consequently also be denied that GP is a sentence
of our informal mathematics. It is thus reasonable to deny that Beall
has showed that informal mathematics is inconsistent by using GP. This
certainly does not provide an ultimate solution to Go¨del’s paradox, but
it does keep the derived inconsistency out of mathematics and allows us
to set aside the paradox to be solved in line with whatever one’s favourite
solution is to paradoxes generally.4
4A final note on Beall: although the argument I am criticising is from an older paper,
the response offered here would fit well with Beall’s more recent work in (Beall 2009). The
suggestion I have made may be appropriated to make the case that informal proof should
join truth in the category of useful devices, which when introduced bring ‘merely’ semantic
paradoxes as by-products or ‘spandrels’ without thereby rendering the base language (in this
case, that of mathematics) inconsistent.
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Now, let me note two things about what has gone on here which will
be recurrent throughout the paper. Firstly, although this section does not
solve Go¨del’s paradox, this is not really necessary for the purposes of the
current project. Beall, Priest and others have a substantial case for the
inconsistency of natural languages, a case which is not the target of this
paper and would have to be addressed separately if one were so inclined.
For both of these authors the claim that mathematics is inconsistent is
an additional one that is supported by additional argumentation and it is
precisely these arguments which I am targeting. Thus, by rejecting that
Go¨del’s paradox is part of mathematics, what has been done is to show
that these additional arguments do not cover more ground than the orig-
inal case for the inconsistency of natural languages and therefore don’t
provide added support for dialetheism from the realm of mathematics.
Secondly, the separation between being part of mathematics and the con-
cepts used about mathematics is not just a way to re-introduce the object
language/meta-language distinction for informal mathematics. A sepa-
ration of languages is not important because the point is not really one
about languages, instead it is about the subject-matter of mathematics.
While we may use GP to argue that the concept of informal provability is
inconsistent, this does no more work than the liar or any other semantic
paradox unless it infects the realm of mathematics. As such, showing that
informal proof is not the kind of thing to be investigated mathematically
blocks the argument considered in this section.
4 Priest’s Argument for the Inconsistency
of Informal Mathematics
In Chapter 3 of (Priest 1987), entitled “Go¨del’s Theorem”, Priest makes
use of Go¨del’s paradox in the same way as Beall subsequently went on to
do, arguing that it shows that informal mathematics is inconsistent. In
Priest’s case, however, it is given as the culmination of a longer argument
which aims to show that informal proof satisfies the conditions for Go¨del’s
first incompleteness theorem in such a way as to lead to its inconsistency.
This section will focus on explaining the details of Priest’s argument.
Priest wants to show that informal proof is susceptible to Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem. The first hurdle is that the theory of informal
proofs is, on the surface at least, not formal and hence not immediately
susceptible to Go¨del’s theorem. Priest addresses this in the following way:
It should be said at once that naive proof, or at least the naive
theory it generates, is not a formal theory in the sense of the
theorem; but it is accepted by mathematicians that informal
mathematics could be formalised if there were ever a point to
doing so, and the belief seems quite legitimate. The language of
naive proof, a fragment of English, could have its syntax tidied
up so that it was a formal language, and the set of na¨ıve the-
orems expressed in this language would be deductively closed.
Hence we may, without injustice, talk about the naive theory
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as if it were a formal theory. (Priest 1987, p. 41)5
In section 5, I will claim that Priest’s reasoning fails to go through at this
point. For now, though, let us complete Priest’s argument that informal
proof satisfies the conditions of Go¨del’s theorem. The other pieces that
Priest needs are that the formalised theory can express all recursive func-
tions and that the proof relation of the formalised theory is recursive. He
rightly takes the first requisite to be obviously satisfied and the second
to be the contentious one, listing a number of possible objections and
his replies. A discussion of these would be irrelevant to the purposes of
this paper, so for now we shall grant that the formalised proof relation is
recursive.
Given that Priest has now established that informal proof satisfies the
conditions of Go¨del’s theorem, the thrust of his argument is as follows:
For let T be (the formalisation of) our naive proof procedures.
Then, since T satisfies the conditions of Go¨del’s theorem, if T
is consistent there is a sentence ϕ which is not provable in T ,
but which we can establish as true by a naive proof, and hence
is provable in T . The only way out of the problem, other than
to accept the contradiction, and thus dialetheism anyway, is to
accept the inconsistency of naive proof. So we are forced to ad-
mit that our naive proof procedures are inconsistent. But our
naive proof procedures just are those methods of deductive ar-
gument by which things are established as true. It follows that
some contradictions are true; that is, dialetheism is correct.
(Priest 1987, p. 44)
Priest soon makes the link between ϕ and Go¨del’s paradox. For if we
take ϕ to be the formalisation of GP6, the inconsistency of section 3 will
quickly re-emerge within the formalisation of informal mathematics. A
key point is that a standard move towards incompleteness over inconsis-
tency is to separate the object language from the meta-language, but that
here we are dealing with informal proof and informal mathematics, for
which there is no such distinction, meaning that the orthodox move to-
wards incompleteness is not available. Indeed, this is the entire point of
focusing on informal mathematics.
The conclusion that Priest draws is that we are left with true contra-
dictions and dialetheism.7 Informal mathematics is seen to be inconsis-
tent, but even more penetratingly he can claim that there is no escape
5As the target of his argument, Priest needs to explain what he takes na¨ıve or informal
mathematics to be exactly. He says:
Proof, as understood by mathematicians (not logicians), is that process of deductive
argumentation by which we establish certain mathematical claims to be true. (Priest
1987, p. 40)
His distinction is, in effect, the same as the distinction between formal and informal mathe-
matics as found in section 2.
6The matter is somewhat more complicated than this suggests, of course. Milne discusses
in (Milne 2007) the many ways that Go¨del sentences can be constructed and what exactly
they ‘say’.
7Not just this, though, since Priest takes it that the theory given by the formalisation of
informal mathematics can prove its own soundness and hence must be able to give its own
semantics. From here he takes it to follow that it must be able to prove the T-scheme for this
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from this application of the incompleteness theorems to informal mathe-
matics and so “... we might say that our naive proof procedures are not
just contingently inconsistent, but essentially so... [D]ialetheism is inher-
ent in thought.” (Priest 1987, pp. 47–48) That dialetheism is inherent
in thought is one of the main claims of In Contradiction, supported by
several pillars of argument. The argument described here that informal
mathematics is essentially inconsistent forms one of these pillars, but I
shall argue that this pillar will not hold any weight.
5 Formalising Mathematics
The move from the informal version of mathematics to a formalisation
thereof is, in my opinion, too quick. By endorsing the claim that math-
ematicians take it that informal mathematics can be formalised, Priest
moves from the informal theory to the formal one without much consider-
ation of what this move entails or how the mathematicians he is invoking
conceive of the formalisation process. For one thing, Priest might not
want to endorse the na¨ıve claims of mathematicians at all, since they
most likely take mathematics to also be consistent. If such claims were
definitive it might thus spell the end of dialetheism.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering how exactly the idea that math-
ematics should be formalisable will work precisely. In the first half of this
section I discuss two options, along with how they interact with Priest’s
argument. The first follows a straightforward interpretation of Priest’s
claim but is shown to fail as an account of the formalisation of informal
mathematics. The second avoids the problems with the first but, I argue,
no longer lets Priest’s argument go trough.
5.1 A First Option
Let us call the first option many-one formalisation.8 The idea is that
one takes the entirety of informal mathematics and tidies up the frag-
ment of natural language expressing it to give a formal language. All of
the informal theorems will have particular formal counterparts expressed
in this one formal language, and the set of these formalised theorems is
then deductively closed. For the first option, we consider this as the one
single correct formal counterpart for the informal mathematics, a type of
super-theory9 of mathematics, in which all the current basic assumptions
and their consequences are contained. This mirrors a standard idea of
formalisation involving a routine procedure of ‘filling in the gaps’ (as is
theory inside the theory, giving him all of the paradoxes he describes as semantic (as opposed
to set-theoretic paradoxes). For example, he lists the liar, Grelling’s paradox, Berry’s paradox,
Richard’s paradox and Koenig’s paradox as falling under the umbrella of semantic paradoxes.
In fact, then, Priest argues that “Our naive theory is semantically closed and inconsistent.
By contrast, any consistent theory cannot be semantically closed.” (Priest 1987, p. 47)
8The ‘many’ here is due to the fact that it might end up being case that multiple informal
proofs are mapped to the same formal proof.
9I use the terms ‘super-theory’ and ‘super-system’ throughout this paper. I do not intend
anything of the ‘super-’ prefix besides that it is all-encompassing of mathematics in the way
described.
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discussed, for instance, in the debate between Rav (Rav 1999, 2007) and
Azzouni (Azzouni 2004, 2005) though ultimately rejected by both). Since
the formalisation that occurs is crucial to the application of Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem to informal mathematics, it would be very con-
venient for Priest’s argument if the picture that is sketched here is the
correct one, as this would take formalisation to effectively reduce infor-
mal mathematics to something formal, and thereby allow the argument
to proceed.
Unfortunately, we have good reason to think that this picture can-
not be correct. It is obvious that tidying-up syntax is not going to be a
many-one mapping. If we start with the natural-language versions of our
mathematical theorems, there will be a whole selection of ways in which we
can reproduce these theorems in some particular formal language. Even
translating very simple fragments of mathematics into simple formal sys-
tems can easily lead to a plurality of results. Scaling this up to include
all of mathematics exacerbates this problem significantly. Add to that
the fact that we don’t start with a particular formal language that we are
to be translating the informal into, but instead generate it “on the fly”
based on the syntax of our informal mathematics. That there will only
be one possible result is clearly absurd.10
Note also that the conversion of informal mathematics into this super-
theory is not really like the standard conversion of informal mathematics
into some ‘foundational’ theory such as ZFC set theory (which is poten-
tially what the mathematicians that Priest invokes might have in mind).
For if this were the case we would quickly find ourselves with the Be-
nacerrafian problem that there are a large number of different adequate
representations for our informal concepts (see Benacerraf 1965). This
would lead us out of the first option and its super-theory, into a picture
where there are multiple different formalisations of informal mathematics.
I would like to emphasise here that the worry I am raising with the
generated super-theory is nothing to do with its inconsistency (for such a
theory would undoubtedly be inconsistent) and as such it is not open to
the usual charge of begging the question against the dialetheist.
5.2 A Second Option
As a second option, Priest could hold it that the formalisation process for
all mathematics that he is after is actually a case of many-many formal-
isation. As I have already argued, there may be many different formal-
isations of mathematics, which Priest can accept as the case in order to
avoid the problems presented against the many-one formalisation picture.
In essence, this approach is embracing the plurality of formalisations as
opposed to letting it become a problem.
However, accepting this path immediately adds an extra complication
to the argument, in that now Priest’s claims about the formalised ver-
10An anonymous referee suggests that we may be able to distinguish between a plurality of
results which are equivalent under translation and those which genuinely disagree. I believe,
however, that this will not save the argument. In a critical discussion of Azzouni’s formalist
account of proofs (Tanswell 2015), I have previously argued that such a move is not going to
deliver the substantial kind of formalisation required for the argument to proceed.
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sion of informal proof must implicitly be quantifying over formalisations.
In particular, each time he mentions the formalised version of a proof of
informal mathematics, there is no one thing this refers to but instead a
selection of different formalised versions of the informal proof. The next
natural question to follow this up with is how to determine which formal-
isations fall under this quantification for any given proof. Put another
way: which formalisations of informal mathematics will be adequate and
acceptable? For example, a formal language which is too expressively
weak to even state standard theorems would be inadequate and unaccept-
able. The question, then, comes down to finding (and defending) criteria
of adequacy for these formalisations of informal mathematics.
Formalisation, as it is being conceived of here, is not a process of
exposing an underlying logical form already present in the informal proof,
or any thought in this direction. I take this to be the case because informal
proofs will underdetermine the language, system and structure that such
a proof would adhere to and have. It is instead taken to be a process that
is inextricably linked to the context in which it occurs. Relevant factors
include the agent performing the formalisation, their purposes in doing so
and the formal theory they intend to formalise the given informal proof
into. It might be useful here to consider an analogy to Carnap’s notion
of explication (as in Carnap 1945) where there is also no definitive fact of
the matter as to what the correct explication is for some given concept.
Instead the different results are compared and evaluated using pragmatic
measures such as usefulness, simplicity, explanatoriness, precision etc.
In a similar way, there could be a whole range of formalisations that
can be of varying degrees of usefulness in making some informal piece of
mathematical reasoning fully formal. In Priest’s formalisation of all of
informal mathematics we may find a number of different results which are
of varying degrees of usefulness, explanation, accuracy, simplicity etc. Of
course, amongst these there may be a number of formalisations that we
would want to recognise as inadequate, such as that in the above example
of an expressively weak language. We want some way of excluding these
examples of ‘bad’ formalisations of informal mathematics from being im-
plicitly quantified over in Priest’s argument. However Priest would want
to go about this project, we can see that it adds significant philosophical
ground that needs to be supplemented to the argument in question before
it goes through.11
6 On Mathematical Super-Theories
A new worry that emerges from the consideration of different formalisa-
tions concerns the reliance on one (or indeed many) mathematical super-
theories. Since we have seen the analogy to Carnap and want to evaluate
our formalisations using pragmatic principles, we must consider whether
unified mathematical super-theories, in the sense that Priest has proposed,
11An anonymous referee proposes an additional argument against Priest based on this sec-
tion: that the translation on the many-many case is not effective means that informal proof
can therefore not meet the minimum requirements for falling under Go¨del’s theorems. Grist
to the mill!
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are indeed the best when evaluated in this way. In this subsection I will
briefly consider three reasons why this might not be the case.
Before I begin, though, let us just make explicit why for Priest’s ar-
gument there is now the need to formalise all of informal mathematics
in one go, in its entirety, into a super-theory. If this is not done another
key step of the argument cannot go through, namely the step where it
is insisted that the Go¨del sentence is indeed provable. If we were to re-
play the argument just in arithmetic, for example, we would code in (the
formalisation of) informal provability in arithmetic and soon discover the
Go¨del sentence is not provable in this formalisation. But here we would
be free to take the traditional lesson that this is just a limitation on the
formalisation, which may well be incomplete.12 It is only be squeezing
out all room for this incompleteness by quantifying over all mathematics
and informal proof simpliciter that the argument could hope to success-
fully establish that the answer is actually inconsistency rather than mere
incompleteness.13
Let us now consider why this super-theory will run into difficulties.
One worry may be that different fields or areas of mathematics might
be best served by different formal systems, or even different styles of formal
systems. For example, the study of algebra, set theory and geometry
all appear very different at first glance, and so it may be that they are
best served by being formalised into different formal systems (say, with
different proof rules which better track the kinds of inferences made in
these fields). Of course, the judgment here must be relative to some
purpose of formalisation, but we may take the purpose at hand to be
(something like) giving a formal reconstruction of the informal proofs,
which tracks the inferential steps that were being used. To justify this,
recall that Priest’s treatment of informal mathematics as a formal theory
was meant to be “without injustice”.
The first problem I am proposing, then, is that it might be that differ-
ent formal systems, that are tailored to different sub-areas of mathematics,
might allow the more accurate reconstruction of the reasoning present in
the informal proofs for those different areas. It also seems that Priest
cannot point to the fact that the super-system(s) he is after are those
that represent a “tidying up’ of the fragment of natural language that
mathematics is expressed in, because the point that is being pressed here
is that this talk is an over-simplification of a more complex process.
Relatedly, the second concern I have is that diagrammatic proofs may
lead to a significant worry for Priest. In referring to the “fragment of
English” that informal mathematics is expressed in, Priest seems to miss
a wide selection of mathematics that is communicated pictorially. Pic-
tures can serve to communicate mathematical facts, but can also function
as components of informal proofs or proofs in their entirety (see Nelsen
1993, 2000). How is this to be accommodated in the super-systems which
are meant to formalise all of informal mathematics? What will the for-
12And we are well used to theories being incomplete for more reasons than Go¨del theorem.
For instance, Peano arithmetic also has examples like Goodstein’s theorem and the Paris-
Harrington theorem.
13Note that this cannot be avoided by insisting that the Go¨del sentence must be part of
na¨ıve arithmetic without running afoul of the distinction of section 3.
11
malisation process do to diagrammatic proofs? If they are simply to be
eliminated, this once again means that informal mathematics is under-
going a drastic change in the formalisation process. Alternatively, there
are formal systems for diagrams which may serve to formalise some of the
diagrammatic proofs. However, we are now engaged in a project of mak-
ing the super-systems, which originally sounded straightforwardly close
to informal mathematics, encompass much broader pieces of mathemati-
cal reasoning. At the very least, this is a non-trivial undertaking which
involves constructing a mixed-mode formal system which combines tradi-
tional syntactic components with formal diagrammatics. A deeper worry,
however, is that we are now able to question whether it will even be pos-
sible to capture all of the mathematical reasoning that occurs in informal
proofs in formal systems, without doing violence to the source material.
I shall return to this line of thought in section 8.
A third problem we encounter for the mathematical super-theory can
draw on Priest’s own considerations of mathematical pluralism in (Priest
2012). Modern mathematical investigation extends to examining which
results obtain from adopting different logics to work in. Yet if all the
various investigations of different logics are taken to be part of informal
mathematics, what happens when we formalise them into the one super-
theory? Not only do we face the prospect of systems collapsing into one
another, but the more alarming danger of triviality looms. Observe that
some of the logics we might want to use will include the principle of ex-
plosion, most notably classical logic. As soon as a contradiction arises
somewhere in the system (which is exactly what Priest’s argument is at-
tempting to force), immediately it follows that the whole super-system
is trivialised. This is regardless of whether we think that there is some-
thing philosophically wrong with classical mathematics, and the principle
of explosion in particular, since we are just formalising informal mathe-
matics as we found it. This worry also doesn’t rely on logical pluralism,
instead just the more uncontroversial fact of logical plurality.14 In the case
of this worry, Priest’s argument will still go through but using the fact
that a trivial super-system is also inconsistent, which is hardly a desirable
result.
7 Fragmented Formalisations
The counter-suggestion to formalising all of informal mathematics simul-
taneously into one super-theory, with which we have seen some serious
difficulties, is that the formalisation process may be one that can only be
successful when done in a fragmented way. The suggestion is that con-
structing a formal system is achievable when we take smaller “chunks” of
mathematics that we want to formalise, just not when we want to take
it all at the same time. Such an understanding would provide reasonable
solutions to dealing with the problems of previous section, without giving
up the possibility of formalising parts of mathematical reasoning.
14I take it that, as mathematicians, we don’t need to commit ourselves to the truth, in some
philosophical sense, of the mathematics that is being carried out.
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Let us see why switching from the idea of a super-theory to the frag-
mented approach is not a good option if we want to maintain Priest’s
argument that informal mathematics is inconsistent by Go¨del’s First In-
completeness Theorem. The issue is that the argument relies on capturing
informal mathematics fully to insist that the sentence ϕ, which is unprov-
able in the formalised version of informal mathematics but is nonetheless
established by informal proof, must also by provable in the formalised sys-
tem. If, however, it fails to obtain that any one theory does successfully
formally represent all of informal mathematics as a whole, then it cannot
be insisted that the last step holds. The point is that we get to the fact
that the sentence must be true in the system because the system includes
all informal mathematical reasoning. If we do not guarantee this, then
the inconsistency is not guaranteed either.
Undermining this last step is sufficient for giving a criticism of Priest’s
argument, but what we have seen so far forms a somewhat deeper diffi-
culty. Priest’s more general project in In Contradiction is to re-examine
the balance between completeness and consistency, insisting that it is the
latter we jettison in light of Go¨del’s theorems rather than the former,
which is the orthodox choice. Recall that in section 3 we set aside Beall’s
use of the same balancing act, where he suggests that when formalising
mathematical reasoning we are returned to the completeness/consistency
dichotomy. What has implicitly been done here, then, is to use consider-
ations of the process of formalisation to give an independent motivation
for why we might prefer to end up with an incomplete system when for-
malising informal proofs, without making reference to any concerns about
consistency.
8 On The Formal and The Informal
For all that has been said, I think there is another more devastating
objection to Priest’s argument. In part 5.1 we saw that the idea that there
would only be one formalised counterpart of informal mathematics would
not hold any water. However, it was only on this reading that it seemed
acceptable to treat informal mathematics as if it were a formal theory, at
least superficially, stemming from the fact that there was one ‘body’ of
informal mathematics and one formalisation thereof. Nonetheless, having
been discussing the difficulties involved in formalising theories, it should
now be becoming clearer that there was something fishy going on in this
step of the argument.
The objection is the following: by moving from informal proof to a
formalised version thereof, Priest’s argument is guilty of changing the
subject. The argument intended to show that informal proof was incon-
sistent, and not just coincidentally but inherently so. Yet, almost im-
mediately in the reasoning, to get the application of the incompleteness
results off the ground, Priest needs the subject of his argument to be a
formal theory. The answer, therefore, is that mathematics is not a for-
mal theory and that transforming it to be one will do an injustice to its
source material. The argument speaks as if the multiple representations
that informal mathematics can have as formal systems are identical to the
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informal mathematics itself, but this is just a confusion of distinct things.
While Priest was looking to demonstrate that informal mathematics
was inherently inconsistent, an option that is now on the table is that
mathematical reasoning is inherently informal, a view common in the
mathematical practice literature (e.g. Larvor 2012), or that it may be in-
herently incomplete, or indeed both. The thought would then, in these
cases, be that no formal system would suffice to adequately capture math-
ematics in its entirety. Indeed, this is the traditional lesson that people
take from the incompleteness results, but this standard result relies on the
question-begging move from consistency to incompleteness. Now, though,
we have seen independent motivations for thinking so and rejecting the
argument.
Priest’s challenge was looking to adjust the balance between consis-
tency and completeness in favour of the latter over the former. But now,
by considering the third axis of formality and informality, we have ob-
tained a way to defend incompleteness over inconsistency in the formal
setting without begging the question.15 For the argument relies on a num-
ber of assumptions about the nature of formalisation which allow one to
easily and without injustice take informal mathematics into formal math-
ematics. I have, to the contrary, argued that this distinction runs deep
and cannot be bypassed lightly, meaning that arguments that work for
formal theories cannot be straightforwardly applied to informal mathe-
matics, and ultimately that Priest’s argument does not go through.
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